Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...) to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity. (shrink)

Concepts d'espace est un classique de la philosophie et de l'histoire des sciences. Enrichi d'une celebre preface d'Albert Einstein, l'ouvrage de Max Jammer couvre pres de vingt-cinq siecles d'elaboration du concept d'espace physique. L'auteur allie la methode historique a la methode philosophique dans l'analyse des differentes traditions scientifique et philosophique, et c'est la l'originalite de ce travail dont la coherence tient a l'unite d'une question sans cesse remise sur le metier: le probleme de l'espace dans la theorie physique. Depuis sa (...) premiere parution en 1954, l'ouvrage a ete considerablement augmente, d'abord en 1969 par l'allongement du cinquieme chapitre consacre au concept d'espace dans la science moderne, puis en 1993, par l'ajout d'un sixieme et dernier chapitre visant a apprecier les avancees theoriques nouvelles. L'edition francaise comporte une postface originale de Marc Lachieze-Rey qui prolonge et renouvelle l'analyse de Max Jammer par une presentation de certains developpements actuels en physique. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names, and the nature of relations. Max A. Freund is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University of Costa Rica and the National University of Costa Rica. He is co-author of the book Modal Logic its syntax and semantics, as well as the author of Judicial Logic, and of a forthcoming book The Logic of Sortals. Max Fernandez de Castro is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico. He is the author of the book Quine y la Ontologíaa and co-author of the books Lógica Matemática I: lógica proposicional, intuicionista y modal, Lógica Matemática II: clásica, intuicionista y modal, Teoría de Conjuntos, Lógica y Temas Afines I. Marco Ruffino is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Campinas and the editor of Manuscrito, the Brazilian international journal for Analytic Philosophy. He has many publications, in important philosophical journals, in the philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; in the history of analytic philosophy, and on Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This article engages with Plato’s justification of art and its core category, the concept of μίμησις. It will be shown that there is a sound systematic difference between two basic meanings of μίμησις in Plato. The proper understanding of this difference has considerable bearing both on the understanding of Plato and on the philosophy of art, since it enables us to bridge two gaps: First, the gap between the standpoint of the early and middle Plato with its famous criticism of (...) art, on the one hand, and the affirmative re-evaluation of art in the late period, on the other hand. Second, the gap between the two principal pre-modern paradigms employed in justifying art: the ontological paradigm of art as (re)presentation on the one side, and the modern paradigm of art as expression on the other side. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Recent Relativism Standard Semantics and Ordinary Truth Relativist Semantics and Ordinary Truth Issues of Commensurability References.

Posthumously published by Gottfried Boehm, Iconic may well be considered as a concise summa of Max Imdahl’s theories and methods. Referring to Panofsky and to his idea of an art-historical understanding on three levels («pre-iconographic», «iconographic» and «iconological»), Imdahl highlights the limits of such interpretation, suggesting the necessity of overcoming it and outlining a fourth level which he calls «iconic». Basing on this approach, it becomes possible to look at images as self-referential systems, as autonomous domains endowed with a constitutive (...) and productive power irreducible to verbal explanation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological CategoryMax RosenkrantzThomas Dixon. From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 287. Cloth, $60.00Thomas Dixon's From Passions to Emotions defends a provocative set of theses. (1) The concept of "emotion" is of relatively recent vintage, having been designed by secular Scottish writers in the first half (...) of the nineteenth century. (2) That concept embraces a range of phenomena that earlier Christian writers such as Augustine and Aquinas understood in terms of a manifold of concepts such as "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." (3) The concept of "emotion" is too crude an instrument for understanding human psychology. Further, (4) today the secular conceptual framework has completely displaced the religious one. This has nothing to do with the former's greater proximity to the truth, as is shown by the persistence of cogent Christian theories in the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of secularism's triumph; and (5) The opposition between reason and emotion arises only when theorists begin to think of "emotions" rather than "appetites," "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." Christian writers did not see the passions as simply the enemies of reason.The basis for Dixon's argument is his interpretation of nineteenth-century psychological theory in the English speaking world. Specifically he argues that the concept of "emotion" was invented by the Scottish thinker Thomas Brown (1778-1820). Brown's innovation was then appropriated and developed by Spencer, Darwin, and William James. The foil for this story is the Christian tradition represented most compellingly by Augustine and Aquinas and carried on by a host of lesser nineteenth-century figures. In my judgment, the story thus told cannot bear the weight Dixon places upon it.The centerpiece of Dixon's argument is his claim that Brown "invents" (109) the emotions and thereby initiates a conceptual revolution in western thought. While Dixon may be right in asserting that Brown is the first to use the word 'emotion' in a systematic fashion, this achievement is merely terminological. Brown deploys the term to develop a mechanistic account of human nature, one in which the springs of action are located not in the will and reason, but in the emotions. Replace 'emotion' in the preceding sentence with 'passion' and one gets a concise characterization of Hobbes's view. Dixon is aware that Brown and others work within a Hobbesian framework (250) but does not attend to that framework. Thus his claims for the significance of the developments he describes fail to convince. The real innovation in psychological theory—as in so much else—took place in the seventeenth century.Just as Dixon overestimates the importance and originality of the Scottish writers he discusses, so too he overestimates the intellectual importance of Augustine and Aquinas. His presentation of their views (26-62) is accurate, but he does not note that they take over the Platonic-Aristotelian view of the soul according to which reason can and should penetrate, educate and direct the passions. Thus the guiding thought that structures the work—the nineteenth century witnesses an ultimately successful revolt against Christian psychology—must be rejected. The revolt is against ancient, pre-Christian modes of thought and is undertaken and largely won in the seventeenth century. The events Dixon describes are skirmishes in that larger campaign.The rest of the theses Dixon defends can be dispatched with more quickly. The idea that the modern concept of "emotion" is insufficiently subtle is averted to frequently, but never adequately defended. At no point does Dixon demonstrate, or even claim to demonstrate, that Christian thinkers recognized something secular thinkers miss. Roughly the same can be said for his claims about the persistence of Christian psychology in the nineteenth century. What Dixon means is not just that such thinkers exist, but that their thought remains vibrant. Again I see no argument for such a verdict. Finally, there is the matter of the opposition between reason and passion. To his credit Dixon rejects the view according to which almost all Western thought is hostile to the passions. As he shows, this... (shrink)

This is the first of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. Each of the Companions presents a pre-publication version of the introduction to one of the Volumes and, for Volume 1, it also sets the stage for the entire, printed collection. As the collection forms part of a Critical Concepts in Psychology series, this selection of major works focuses mainly on works (...) that have a direct psychological relevance. From the mid 19th Century onwards, psychology began to separate itself from philosophy, and the development of psychological thought about consciousness links intimately to the development of psychology itself. In order to trace this development, the four volumes of this collection follow a rough, historical sequence. Volume 1 deals with The Origins of Psychology and the Study of Consciousness. Volumes 2 and 3 deal with contemporary Cognitive and Neuropsychological Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. And Volume 4 focuses mainly on New Directions: Psychogenesis, Transformations of Consciousness and Non-reductive, Integrative Theories, which deal with issues likely to expand current, mainstream thought in potentially novel, and, sometimes, challenging directions. -/- The printed, 4-Volume collection presents 89 major readings (or salient extracts from major readings) drawn from the entire field of Consciousness Studies, along with these introductions and an extensive index. It also introduces 5 additional readings that were selected for inclusion, but could not be reprinted for the reason that reprint permissions were prohibitively expensive. Although these online Companions cannot substitute for the 2000 page hard copy, they do provide a wealth of additional resources in the form of online links to supplementary readings (marked in pink) and to the readings themselves (marked in blue). In many cases the online sources are freely available or available through institutional subscriptions. Links are also provided for some of the readings that require access to complex colour plates, thereby making the four Companions complementary to the collection itself. -/- This Companion to Volume 1 focuses on the selection criteria for the collection, the problems presented by consciousness and how to organize these into groups, the ancient history of thought about consciousness, mind and soul, the emergence of psychology as the empirical study of consciousness and mind, the emergence of behaviorism, cognitive psychology and the re-emergence of the study of mind, initial ideas about the role of consciousness in human information processing, the strengths of functionalist accounts of mind, the weaknesses of functionalist accounts of consciousness, competing psychological theories about the nature and function of consciousness, interdisciplinary influences, and the formation of Consciousness Studies. (shrink)

Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems—what consciousness is, and what (...) consciousness does—that require all three. In this, careful attention to conscious phenomenology and finding an appropriate way to relate first-person evidence to third-person evidence appears to be central to progress. But we may also need to re-examine what we take to be “natural facts” about the world, and how we can know them. The same appears to be true for a trans-cultural understanding of consciousness that combines classical Indian phenomenological methods with the third-person methods of Western science. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Recent Relativism Standard Semantics and Ordinary Truth Relativist Semantics and Ordinary Truth Issues of Commensurability References.

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematical impact on the concept of logic. My paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the “Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) in general. Kant’s fundamental (...) question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. In a first part, I shall demonstrate the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. A brief outline of Kant’s answer to this question, with special emphasis on his revolutionary new comprehension of logical form, will be given as well. A second part shall open up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. I will answer the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? I will argue that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application. (shrink)

Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) have gripped the public imagination ever since Raymond Moody’s watershed book Life After Life brought them to widespread attention in 1975. These experiences are commonly reported to involve the sensation of leaving one’s body and watching efforts by medical per-sonnel at resuscitation or even events further afield, as well as experiences of passing through a tunnel towards a being of light and love and meeting deceased friends and relatives. Such experiences are some-times alleged to constitute evidence for (...) an afterlife, but exactly how they do so is seldom spelled out pre-cisely. The aim of this paper, then, is to carefully consider three different inferential pathways from data about NDEs to the conclusion that there is an afterlife. I shall argue that at least two of them provide moderately strong support to this conclusion. (shrink)

Robert F. Williams, despite being a central historical figure and noted theorist of the Black radical tradition, is ignored as a subject of philosophical relevance and political theory. His challenges to the racist segregationist regime of the South influenced generations of thinkers and revolutionaries. However he is erased from the annals of thought for his use of armed resistance. This paper aims to introduce his life and work to philosophy as material for study and situate his program of pre-emptive self-defense (...) within the Black radical tradition. (shrink)

One of the world's pre-eminent Max Weber scholars here presents a comprehensive analysis of Weber's ambiguous stance toward modernity considered from a normative, theoretical, and historical point of view. The book is in two parts. Part I scrutinises Weber's world view. On the basis of his thinking about the meaning and inter-relationships of science, politics, and ethics in the modern era, Weber is seen as the embodiment of a social scientist and political thinker who exposes himself to intellectual risks and (...) existential tensions while resisting final solutions. It includes a masterly analysis of Weber's two famous speeches 'Science as a Vocation' and 'Politics as a Vocation'. Part II considers Weber's unfinished project on the sociology of religion. Piecing together planned and partially completed works on Islam and Western Christianity, Schluchter locates them in the history and theory of Weber's overall work. This reconstruction of Weber's work on religion emphasises its interplay between religion, economy, politics, and law. (shrink)

Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen-Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen-Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit reconnaître et qui (...) ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité. Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen-Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considérations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité individuelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique. (shrink)

In the mid-1890s, the left-leaning Christian socialist Friedrich Naumann was the first German public figure to develop national socialism as a systematic world view. Under the influence of Max Weber, Naumann abandoned his Christian-ethical conception of social reform in favour of a national existentialism that overrides any ethical imperative; and he abandoned the pre-modern, Christian foundations of his productivism in favour of modern and nationalist foundations. The outcome was a national socialism underpinned by the synthesis of national existentialism and national (...) productivism; a form of socialism driven by a concern for national order rather than by a vision of social justice or emancipation. This interpretation makes it difficult to maintain a clear demarcation of Naumann's national socialism from its right-wing counterparts and to retain Naumann's image as a progressive reformer. (shrink)

Max Velmans' target article and response to commentaries in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 9, No. 11, 2002, can be seen as something of a milestone in the history of consciousness studies. In them he takes this elusive subject to the limits of rational discussion. Through exhaustive analysis and theorizing, he fills the gaps in our understanding of the multifaceted mind-brain issue. On the one hand, he establishes the mutual irreducibility of the two. On the other, he elucidates their (...) causal interactions. As he explains on page 91, this is possible only because both mind and brain 'are grounded in something deeper' — a 'self-revealing universe'. The ultimate nature of that universe is neither pure matter, nor pure spirit. It is a combination of the two. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo pretende realizar una confrontación entre el modelo fenomenológico de Merleau-Ponty y la propuesta deconstructiva de Derrida acerca del tema del lenguaje y de la problemática genética. En Merleau-Ponty, la cuestión genética se vincula a la noción de cuerpo y a la expresividad precategorial de los gestos, en los que el silencio describe una dimensión opaca e inalcanzable temáticamente, pero originaria y decisiva para la mirada fenomenológica. Por otra parte, Derrida es un crítico muy radical de todo uso (...) filosófico de un origen pleno, y por lo tanto también de la proyección de un silencio primitivo pretendida por Merleau-Ponty. Sin embargo, la noción de silencio de Merleau-Ponty no cumple cabalmente la función que Derrida le asigna, siendo siempre para Merleau-Ponty un espacio diacrónico y diferencial. El texto que sigue pretende mostrar los puntos de contactos y de distancias entre Merleau-Ponty y Derrida con respecto al tema del lenguaje en general, haciendo también hincapié sobre la cuestión de la literatura, a la que ambos filósofos se dedican ampliamente y a la que ambos pretenden extender las cuestiones evocadas, con el objeto de demostrar que en este ámbito los motivos de oposición entre los dos planteamientos se hacen efímeros.: This article aims to realize a confrontation between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological model and Derrida's deconstructive proposal, with regard to the subject of language and the genetic problematic. In Merleau-Ponty, the genetic question is linked to the notion of the body and the pre-categorial expressiveness of gestures, in which silence describes a dimension that is opaque and thematically unattainable, but original and decisive for the phenomenological viewpoint. Derrida, in contrast, is a radical critic of the philosophical use of such origin, and therefore also of the projection to a primitive silence sought by Merleau-Ponty. However, the notion of silence in Merleau-Ponty does not fully meet fully the role assigned to it by Derrida, silence being always for Merleau-Ponty a diachronic and differential space. This article aims to show the points in common and the differences between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on the issue of language in general. Also discussed is the topic of literature, with which both philosophers are widely engaged and to which both try to extend the issues under consideration in this paper. It is argued that in this area the motives behind the opposition between the two approaches become ephemeral. (shrink)

Despite having been underlined as contrary to established fact, the myth that there is a causal link between Protestantism and the emergence of capitalism persists in the popuar imagination as well as the academy. This article illustrates where Max Weber’s theory contradicts all the available historical evidence concerning the emergence of free economies in the West. It shows not only where Weber’s theory is unable to account for the emergence of capitalist practices and thinking before the Reformation, but also the (...) manner in which capitalism’s development in the post-reformation era contradicts Weber’s theory. It then turns to illustrating the ways in which medieval Catholicism contributed to the emergence of the cultural and institutional prerequisites of post- Reformation capitalism, and the manner in which post-Reformation political and religious developments contribute to the emergence of merchantilist and protectionist practices that inhibited economic liberty.Bien qu’ayant été considéré comme contraire au fait établi, le mythe selon lequel il y aurait un lien causal entre le Protestantisme et l’émergence du capitalisme persiste dans l’imagination populaire aussi bien que dans le corps académique. Cet article illustre où la théorie de Max Weber est en contradiction avec toutes les évidences historiques disponibles concernant l’émergence des économies capitalistes en Occident. Il montre non seulement où la théorie de Weber est incapable de prendre en compte l’émergence de pratiques capitalistes et des pensées avant la Réforme, mais aussi la manière dont le développement du capitalisme durant la période suivant la Réforme contredit la théorie de Weber. Il illustre ensuite les manières dont le catholicisme médiéval contribua à l’émergence des pré-requis culturels et institutionnels au capitalisme de l’ère qui suivit la Réforme, et la manière à travers laquelle les développements politiques et religieux postérieurs à la Réforme contribuèrent à l’émergence de pratiques mercantilistes et protectionnistes qui inhibèrent la liberté économique. (shrink)

Though they worked in very different disciplines, Max Weber and Thomas Mann were engaged from early in their careers in a remarkably similar enterprise converging on questions of personal identity and national self-understanding, and built upon conceptions drawn from a common intellectual and national heritage. Harvey Goldman's ambitious new book is about a part of that enterprise, the foundation of their understanding of the relation of self and work as set out in Weber's essays on religion and Mann's pre-World War (...) I writings. Weber and Mann sought to revitalize a set of ideas of character and action—calling and personality—to guide their own lives and intellectual creation, as well as politics and the life of the nation. In their hands these ideas also became explanatory tools for understanding the crisis of their class and of Germany. By organizing the interpretation of Weber and Mann around the conceptual nexus of calling and personality, the author reveals a number of issues and problems that have been overlooked, providing an altogether new approach to Weber's famous explanation of the capitalist spirit and recovering a vital modern debate around the idea and meaning of the person. In the convergence of so many themes in their writings, Weber and Mann exemplify the self-understanding of their age and cast a special light on problems of self, identity, and social life. This work contains fascinating material for students of intellectual history and modern political theory. Anyone concerned generally with twentieth-century European history, politics, philosophy, and literature will welcome this rich, vigorously written book. (shrink)

Para Max Weber, a sociedade não pode ser compreendida em sua totalidade. Max Weber tem como referência uma realidade infinita e complexa, analisada a partir de um determinado ponto de vista. O problema da seleção da realidade nas ciências histórico-sociais, abordado por Max Weber no início da segunda seção dos Estudos críticos sobre a lógica das ciências da cultura, é fundamental para a estrutura de sua metodologia científica. Este momento pré-científico da metodologia é que permitirá a construção de uma possível (...) constelação causal. É o investigador que, dotado de interesse, seleciona a realidade e dá sentido a ela. Demonstra, agindo desta maneira, o que merece ser para ele conhecido no fluxo infinito da realidade. Argumenta Max Weber que a “relação com os valores” permite ao cientista o recorte e ordenação do objeto, conferindo sentido a esta parte da realidade que detém significação geral para o pesquisador. Assim, o argumento principal aqui exposto estabelece a importância do interesse cognitivo para Max Weber, já que em sua metodologia o conhecimento seria sempre fruto de um recorte particular, da seleção de um conjunto específico de problemas. Essa seleção ou recorte particular seria, necessariamente, feito a partir das referências do cientista. (shrink)

This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology. The arguments which Weber put forward are fundamental to (...) the methodology of the social sciences, and since his death it has come to be increasingly widely held that with perhaps the sole exception of Mill's System of Logic there is still no other body of work of comparable importance in the academic literature on these topics. Runciman's attempt to correct Weber's mistakes therefore constitutes in itself a valuable contribution to the philosophy of social science. (shrink)

Questo articolo ricostruisce la dimensione formale dell’ontologia elaborata da Max Scheler fra il 1908-1909 ed il 1922, nel corso cioè della sua prima fase produttiva d’interesse fenomenologico. Particolare attenzione è riservata alla struttura “architettonica” della prima ontologia formale scheleriana, composta da un trivium di sotto-discipline formali. L’autore elabora in questo modo la distinzione, sostenuta dai maggiori rappresentanti dei primi Circoli tedeschi di fenomenologia realista, fra un’ontologia formale “pura” che indaga la regione formale analitica dell’“oggettività in generale” e ontologie formali generali (...) interessate alle forme o categorie oggettuali dell’essere reale, organizzato in sommi generi materiali. L’articolo mostra inoltre come l’approccio scheleriano all’ontologia formale apra percorsi di recupero e rielaborazione di un’idea tipicamente pre-moderna: l’ontologia è disciplina che tratta anche dell’ordine sovra-predicamentale delle relazioni trascendentali. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 293 graphies, which put the individual thinkers and their works into their proper doctrinal context, are very welcome. Noack tries to be, and is, fair. We saw that he even tries to find a common ground between phenomenological and analytical philosophy. He does not reject the latter at the outset. He is objective within the limits of his philosophical upbringing and his historical background. MAx RIESZR New (...) YorIc City Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. An Introduction to His Thought. By George Joseph Seidel, O. S. B. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964. Pp. x + 169.) Seidel's book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Soeratics, is a carefully documented explication of Heidegger's interpretations of Parnmnides and Heraclitus. Beyond this it attempts and in large measure succeeds in giving an account of tteidegger's understanding of the western philosophical tradition as originated and at the same time fatefully misled by the Greeks. Seidel intends his study to be an introduction to Heidegger's thought. For purposes of evaluation I will divide my remarks into three major categories: (1) Seidel's work as an introduction to Heidegger's philosophy, (2) Seidel's work as an account of Heidegger's philosophy, and (3) the value of the work to the historian of philosophy and to the philosopher. Seidel's rejections of various al~rnative approaches to Heidegger's thought are somewhat contrived and not terribly convincing, which brings into question the author's claim tt~at Heidegger is approached least prejudicially through his interpretations of the presocratics. There are I think even more compelling reasons for rejecting Seidel's claim. In fact, there are strong reasons for rejecting his approach. I shall deal with them shortly. The author rejects an approach to Heidegger through Heidegger's Kantbuch (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysilc) because of the difficulty involved in disentangling Kant's views, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's views, and Heidegger's own views as revealed in these interpretations. The same difficulty, however, pertains with respect to YIeidegger's interpretations of Parmenides and Heraclitus, though I suspect classical scholars will react with no small degree of indignation to the suggestion that Heidegger's interpretations of these thinkers are not easily distinguishable from what they actually said. To give but one more example, Seidel rejects an approach to tIeidegger through Hegel on the grounds that the similarities holding between the two thinkers tends to blind one to their essential differences. Now if this were truly the case, and I seriously doubt that it is, it is a very sad commentary on the capacities of historians and scholars of German philosophy. Leaving aside the fact that the reasons offered for the purpose of eliminating various alternative approaches to tteidegger are dubious, let us consider Seidel's own approach. There are at least two strong reasons for rejecting it. To begin with, it is indispensable to an understanding of Heidegger's "conversations" with past thinkers that his views on the nature of the history of philosophy be grasped. This in turn involves a commentator in that nest. of problems which center in and around I]eidegger's understanding of the nature of history. This leads one back ultimately to a discussion of Heidegger's conception of time and of temporality, for it is temporality that grounds and makes intelligible historicity and with it those sets of happenings which come to be understood as historical. Heidegger makes clear in Sein und Zeit that a proper understanding of time is necessary not only for the articulation of Being, but that it is the indespensable horizon in terms of which a phenomenological destruction--and, one might add, understanding--of the history of ontology is possible. Now Seidel is by no means unaware of this, but nonetheless he fails to give us any more than a sketchy account of Heidegger's understanding of time and temporality, and he gives us little more information with respect to history and historicity. The information he does give--at least in the case of history--is accurate enough, but it lacks that amplification and care for detail that would permit us a comprehension of the nature and significance of Heidegger... (shrink)

In his lifelong effort to overcome the limits of Panofsky’s iconological method, Max Imdahl tried to sketch out an «iconic understanding» which is pre-reflexive, performed below the level of conceptual and verbal explication. Under the auspices of Konrad Fiedler’s theoretical position, Imdahl opposed the Panofskian «recognizing view» with a more formalistic «seeing view», in order to gain access to a third form of vision which he called «knowing view». After outlining Imdahl’s critic of the reduced and unilateral significance of «form» (...) and «formal composition» in Panofsky’s approach, I will clarify how far Imdahl has gone in the analysis of what should be properly defined as an authentic logic of images . Then, focusing on a paradigmatic case study, I will show the importance of the syntax of an image (i.e. the positioning of its elements on the left or on the right, underneath or above, in the back or in the front) for its semantic meaning. (shrink)

This paper grapples with two objections against Max Weber’s methodology that arise because Weber borrows some ideas from Heinrich Rickert’s neo-Kantian philosophical system. The first objection (“the contradiction argument”) is raised by Julius J. Schaaf who disagrees with Weber’s claim that historical objects are constituted through retrospectively and hypothetically applied selections of value relations and that we can understand these objects. Weber’s idea that the relating ideal type constructions are also non-arbitrary—i.e., not merely subjective—and can be rectified, Schaaf maintains, contradicts (...) his own characterization of historical objects and reality. The second objection (“the incom¬patibility argument”) was made by Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian. It focuses on the conception of objective possibility. According to this, counter¬factual chains of historical events are contrived to figure out the relevant set of causes by which a certain event can be said to necessarily occur. The critics claim that it is only based on the ontological assumption of a preexisting real object that this thought-experiment can operate. That is, the pre-emptive assumption of realism is indis¬pensable for explaining the historical individual. To refute these two objections, I clarify some foundational notions and ideas of Weber’s methodology. (shrink)

In light of research showing that climate change policy opinions and perceptions of climate change are conditioned by pre-held values, Max Scheler’s axiology, conception of ethos, and sociology of knowledge are revisited. Scheler provides a critical analysis of the values surrounding modern technology’s relation to nature, especially in his assessment of the subordination of life to utility, or, the “ethos of industrialism”. The ethos of industrialism is said to influence the modern understanding of the environment as a machine to be (...) controlled for human aims. Scheler’s phenomenological proto-environmental sociology can contribute to the environmental social sciences in three ways: articulating the axiological basis of human knowledge of the environment; offering new values to consider in future research on the social dimensions of human-nature relations; and a framework for connecting socio-ecological analysis with evaluation, specifically for evaluating different types of technologies based on their relation to the environment. (shrink)

Riassunto: Questo lavoro tratta le dimensioni analitiche della hyletica e della genetica nella prima fenomenologia della percezione sensibile di M. Scheler, caratterizzata da una fondazione realistica della materia e della forma del percetto. La hyletica fenomenologica indaga la “materia” o contenuto qualitativo del vissuto nel suo aspetto pre-intenzionale di dato sensoriale informe, privo cioè di forma oggettiva. La genetica fenomenologica indaga la genesi o formazione dei due poli della relazione intenzionale atto-oggetto, a partire dal loro originario momento d’indistinzione allo stadio (...) primitivo della coscienza percettiva. In questo lavoro si sottolinea l’originale elaborazione scheleriana dell’analisi fenomenologica: hyletica e genetica sono parte di un’indagine volta a indagare i diversi aspetti della realtà intesa come fenomeno vissuto caratterizzato dalla resistenza delle cose rispetto a un comportamento animato da finalità adattative. Il percipiente non è per Scheler il soggetto autocosciente, ma l’organismo come agente di informazione/comunicazione in costante interazione con il proprio ambiente circostante. Parole chiave: Hyletica fenomenologica; Fenomenologia genetica; Oggetto reale; Materia; Resistenza Matter and Form in Max Scheler’s Early Phenomenological Aesthetics: This paper addresses the analytic dimensions of Hyletics and Genetics in M. Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception, characterized by its realistic foundation for the matter and form of percepts. Phenomenological Hyletics studies the “matter”, i.e., the qualitative content of lived experiences with respect to the pre-intentional aspect of its unformed sensory input, lacking in objectual form. Phenomenological Genetics studies the “genesis” or formation of intentionality’s relata, starting from the early moments of indistinction at the initial phase of perceptual consciousness. This paper highlights the pivotal role and, above all, the original elaboration of these two analytic dimensions by the author: within Scheler’s work, phenomenological Hyletics and Genetics form part of an inquiry that stresses different aspects of reality, understood as a living phenomenon characterized by the resistance of things to adaptive behavior. According to Scheler, therefore, the perceiver is not a self-conscious subject, but rather an organism, i.e., an agent of information-communication that continuously interacts with his surrounding environment. Keywords: Phenomenological Hyletic; Genetic Phenomenology; Real Object; Matter; Resistence. (shrink)

For more than a century the notion of a pre-established harmony between the mathematical and physical sciences has played an important role not only in the rhetoric of mathematicians and theoretical physicists, but also as a doctrine guiding much of their research. Strongly mathematized branches of physics, such as the vortex theory of atoms popular in Victorian Britain, were not unknown in the nineteenth century, but it was only in the environment of fin-de-siècle Germany that the idea of a pre-established (...) harmony really took off and became part of the mathematicians’ ideology. Important historical figures were in this respect David Hilbert, Hermann Minkowski and, somewhat later, Albert Einstein. Roughly similar ideas can be found also among British theorists, among whom Arthur Eddington, Arthur Milne, and Paul Dirac are singled out. Although largely limited to the period 1870–1940, the paper also considers Max Tegmark’s recent hypothesis of the universe being a one-to-one reflection of mathematical structures. (shrink)

Although it is mainly focused on medieval communes, Weber’s thought about the city is relevant because it questions every city and cohabitation: both because Weber tries to grasp its essence and because the medieval city embodies the ideal-type of the democratic city. This characteristic derives directly from the fact that it was born like a “revolutionary usurpation” against feudal and noble pre-existent powers, as a form of “non-legitimate power”. To better understand it, it is necessary to analyze its relation with (...) the Weberian sociology of domination and to observe what the city as “non-legitimate power” contests. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the research program of formal ontology developed by M. Scheler before his last 1922 theoretical shift. Scheler’s theory of dialectical negation will be also investigated. In regard to the first topic, the focus will be on the complex architecture of Scheler’s formal ontology, deepened within a theoretical framework of realistic ontology: integrated into this framework, formal ontology becomes a basic tool for building phenomenological realisms. In regard to the second topic, the focus (...) will be on the close theoretical relationship between Scheler’s mature suggestion of a phenomenological objective dialectics essence-being underlying his theory of the “functionalization of the essential knowledge” (Funktionalizierung der Wesenserkenntnis) ─ systematically presented for the first time in the 1921 work Probleme der Religion ─, and the formal ontological foundation of a logical theory of a “pluralistic” dialectical negation, that is, dually, an intuitionistic, hence paracomplete, and a paraconsistent negation. Finally, it will be introduced the basics of a semiotic interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological formal ontology within the rigorous framework of Category Theory (TC). This interpretation “strengthens” the traditional (inter)subjective side of phenomenological analysis with a new ─ in the application suggested ─ “in the third person” objective side of semiotic analysis, that shares with the first one a common pre-logical and ante-predicative level of inquiry. (shrink)

The article analyzes the economic determinants of the rise and initial growth of Protestantism, specifically Calvinism, described as the Weber reverse problem in light of his thesis of Calvinist outcomes for economy. These determinants of Calvinism are differentiated from its assumed economic outcomes, specifically the emergence and development of modern capitalism in Weberian sociological accounts. It is argued and showed that the economic determinants of Calvinism’s emergence and early evolution are primarily pre-capitalist in character rather than capitalist in the modern (...) sense. Therefore, the initial overarching economic determinant and setting of early Calvinism is considered to be pre-capitalism, as distinguished from modern industrial capitalism, specifically feudalism as the ancien regime of master–servant economy. Such a pre-capitalist determinant and context suggests that of Calvinism was itself economically determined or influenced before presumably determining or influencing modern capitalism.. (shrink)

Douglass North once emphasized that development takes centuries, but he did not have a theory of how and why change occurs. This groundbreaking book advances such a theory by examining in detail why England and Spain developed so slowly from 1000 to 1800. A colonial legacy must go back centuries before settlement, and this book points to key events in England and Spain in the 1260s to explain why Mexico lagged behind the United States economically in the twentieth century. Based (...) on the integration of North's institutional approach with Mancur Olson's collective action theory, Max Weber's theory of value change, and North's focus on dominant coalitions based on rent and military in In the Shadow of Violence, this theory of change leads to exciting new historical interpretations, including the crucial role of the merchant-navy alliance in England and the key role of George Washington's control of the military in 1787. (shrink)

In pre-democratic – also pre-modern – times, religion had been at the centre of much of human life, filling the private as well as the public realm of people’s daily existence. However, with the change to democratic rule in major countries in the modern world (see, most influentially, Article 1 of the French Constitution after the French Revolution and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, influencing all other democracies in their wake), religion has for the most (...) part reflexively been sidelined from public life. Or has it? Does religion not still hold a special place in law in democratic societies, but now in reverse? Firstly, whereas matters of religious faith had throughout the greater part of human history been included in matters of politics, it is now as a matter of course of law excluded, purposely so. Religion is thus still a ‘special case’, a unique aspect of humanity when compared to all other matters, in law as much as in politics and other aspects of public life. Secondly, in the post-secular cultural climate dawning across the world, matters of faith (religion, spirituality) are no longer as stringently excluded from public life, which impacts directly on how religion is touched upon in law, sociology, philosophy, music and other academic disciplines too. Our dawning post-secular age is bringing something new. Two scholars, who have been doing foundational work in this regard, have done so fully in parallel, not taking cognisance of the mutualities in their academic contributions. Otto in Munich, Germany, has been combining his two areas of expertise, the Pentateuch in the Hebrew Bible and the sociologist Max Weber, to indicate the trajectory through history of democratic impulses from Ancient Near Eastern founding documents into the current era. Benson in Sydney, Australia, has on his part been drawing on his expertise in law as practised in Canada and taught in Europe, South Africa and Australia to indicate how, in inclusively liberal democracies, law cannot justifiably be used to exclude religion from the public domain, as has been the usual modern case. Drawing together these parallel contributions, Lombaard places these initiatives within the emerging post-secular climate, which augurs a different way of being religious or non-religious, publicly as much as privately, in democratic societies in our time. (shrink)

Max 150 words. If possible, please submit your abstract in both English and French.When writing an assignment, most students start by searching for information online, which they integrate in their writing and conclude by producing a bibliography for the sources used. They use their informational, writing and referencing skills to do this as well as refer to their plagiarism knowledge to make sure their text is exempt from plagiarism. In this paper, we examined which skills and knowledge students feel the (...) need to further develop in university to prevent plagiarism in their assignments. Professors were also questioned as to their perceptions of their students’ skills development during their pre-university studies. Questionnaires were administered in six Quebec Universities to students (n = 1170) and professors (n = 279). Results show that students feel the need for more training while professors expect students to have already mastered the skills and knowledge to prevent plagiarism. Recommendations are made on how to implement better training for students through a program approach.Lors de la rédaction d’un devoir, la plupart des étudiants universitaires commencent par chercher des informations en ligne, qu’ils intègrent dans leur rédaction et terminent en produisant une bibliographie des sources utilisées. Ils utilisent leurs compétences informationnelles, rédactionnelles, et de référencement documentaire et se réfèrent à leurs connaissances en matière de plagiat pour s’assurer que leur texte en soit exempt. Dans cet article, nous avons examiné les compétences et les connaissances que les étudiants ressentent le besoin de développer davantage à l’université pour prévenir le plagiat dans leurs travaux. Les professeurs ont également été interrogés sur leur perception du développement des compétences de leurs étudiants durant leurs études pré-universitaires. Des questionnaires ont été administrés dans six universités québécoises à des étudiants (n = 1170) et à des professeurs (n = 279). Les résultats montrent que les étudiants ressentent le besoin d’une formation plus poussée alors que les professeurs s’attendent à ce que les étudiants maîtrisent déjà les compétences et les connaissances nécessaires pour prévenir le plagiat. Des recommandations sont formulées sur la façon de mettre en œuvre une meilleure formation pour les étudiants par le biais d’une approche-programme. (shrink)

When we talk about Presocratic philosophy, we are speaking about the origins of Greek philosophy and Western rationality itself. But what exactly does it mean to talk about “Presocratic philosophy” in the first place? How did early Greek thinkers come to be considered collectively as Presocratic philosophers? In this brief book, André Laks provides a history of the influential idea of Presocratic philosophy, tracing its historical and philosophical significance and consequences, from its ancient antecedents to its full crystallization in the (...) modern period and its continuing effects today. Laks examines ancient Greek and Roman views about the birth of philosophy before turning to the eighteenth-century emergence of the term “Presocratics” and the debates about it that spanned the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He analyzes the intellectual circumstances that led to the idea of Presocratic philosophy—and what was and is at stake in the construction of the notion. The book closes by comparing two models of the history of philosophy—the phenomenological, represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the rationalist, represented by Ernst Cassirer—and their implications for Presocratic philosophy, as well as other categories of philosophical history. Other figures discussed include Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Nietzsche, Max Weber, and J.-P. Vernant. Challenging standard histories of Presocratic philosophy, the book calls for a reconsideration of the conventional story of early Greek philosophy and Western rationality. (shrink)

Two eye-tracking experiments investigated how and when pointing gestures and location descriptions affect target identification. The experiments investigated the effect of gestures and referring expressions on the time course of fixations to the target, using videos of human gestures and human voice, and animated gestures and synthesized speech. Ambiguous, yet informative pointing gestures elicited attention and facilitated target identification, akin to verbal location descriptions. Moreover, target identification was superior when both pointing gestures and verbal location descriptions were used. These findings (...) suggest that gesture not only operates as a context to verbal descriptions, or that verbal descriptions operate as a context to gesture, but that they complement one another in reference resolution. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The late John Austin's William James Lectures 1 might well have borne the subtitle ‘In Pursuit of a Vanishing Distinction’. Although the chase is remorseless, glimpses of the quarry become increasingly equivocal and the hunter is left empty-handed at last. It is hard to know what has gone awry. Has the wrong game been pursued—and in the wrong direction?

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Love of Country and Love of God: The Political Uses of Religion in MachiavelliBenedetto Fontana*This paper will discuss the place of religion in Machiavelli’s thought. 1 The traditional and generally accepted interpretation presents Machiavelli’s religion as a belief system whose value is determined by its functional utility to the state. In this he is said to resemble Cicero, 2 Montesquieu, 3 and Tocqueville, 4 among others. This view is (...) based on the proposition—one that is now fundamental to a modern understanding of Machiavelli—that his political theory develops a politics without moral, theological, and religious foundations (what Benedetto Croce 5 calls the “autonomy of politics” and Sheldon Wolin 6 the “autonomy of political theory”). Students of Machiavelli who ascribe to him an instrumentalist theory of religion rest their interpretation on this conception of politics: a distinction is established between religion viewed as religio, and religion conceived as fides, where the former is used to develop and cement social bonds and the latter is a faith based on a transcendent “truth.”A reading of the texts shows that Machiavelli discusses various kinds of religion. He refers, for example, to multiple forms of Christianity, such as “primitive” [End Page 639] or original Christianity, 7 official, medieval Christianity, the ecclesiastical principality of the papacy, as well as to ancient Judaism, 8 paganism, and to Islam. 9 However, it is possible to discern in Machiavelli two principal or distinctive types. One is based on the opposition Machiavelli sees between the religion of the Romans (which instills virtù) and the religion of the post-classical and post-Roman Christian world (which teaches humility and passivity). The other is prophetic religion, in which Machiavelli contrasts the prophet armed to the prophet unarmed. Thus, we have prophetic religion and non-prophetic religion; the former is either armed or unarmed, and the latter is either immanent (natural) or transcendent. 10Machiavelli’s stress on the importance of virtù (whether of the prince or of the people) suggests that religion is not simply religio—that is, a political technique to rule and to control the masses. Rather, it presupposes a concern for a moral fides which, though certainly not transcendent, is nevertheless necessary to the construction of a political order based on virtù. His concern with civil and military virtue links the armed prophetic religion with that of the ancient Romans, such that ancient Judaism, Islam, and a reformed Christianity (a kind of Lutheranism ante litteram) all stand opposed to primitive and post-classical Christianity.Machiavelli anticipates in theory the national, anti-papal, and anti-imperial movements that were later realized in history by the Lutheran and Calvinist Reformations. He attempts to infuse the corrupt and decadent Christian conception of the world with a new, innovating spirit, one opposed to the prevailing medieval and scholastic conception of the world. In the past Christian philosophers and thinkers revised the classical notions of virtus and arete, transforming them into Christian concepts of value. Machiavelli attempts a similar “transvaluation of values” (Nietzsche), but for different ends and in a different direction: he reinterprets the Christian religion in order to assimilate it into his conception of virtù and his vision of a vivere civile.In the first part of this paper the relation Machiavelli establishes between “speaking with God” and the founding and/or reforming of states is explored. Parallels between Christian and pre-Christian (pagan and biblical) rulers reveal a basic ambiguity in Machiavelli’s belief that religion—that is, the claim of having spoken with God—is necessary to effective rule. In the second part [End Page 640] Machiavelli’s teaching (“new ways and methods”) is compared to Christ’s message of the “good news.” The contrast between the two is presented in terms of an opposition between different “ways of living,” each with its specific moral claims and political consequences. The opposition is not, the section argues, between logos and kratos, ethos and kratos, but rather between diverse ways of understanding logos and ethos. The final section argues that Machiavelli uses biblical, pagan, and Christian forms of religious symbols and metaphors in order to reevaluate the concepts of patria and amore. In so doing... (shrink)

This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2)whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process” , 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person (...) viewable causal efficacy of consciousness counts as ‘real’ causal efficacy and 6) a clarification of the sense in which first- and third-person causal accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible. (shrink)